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RESPONSE

DOCTRINAL DILEMMA

GIRARDEAU A. SPANN

*

†

In response to Kimberly West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry: When Title
VI Trumps State Anti–Affirmative Action Laws, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1075
(2009).
INTRODUCTION
In The River Runs Dry: When Title VI Trumps State Anti–Affirmative
1
Action Laws, Professor Kimberly West-Faulcon has identified a tension
between state anti–affirmative action laws and the continued enrollment of minority students in public universities. The tension is not
surprising, because the voter initiatives that led to those state anti–
affirmative action laws were transparently motivated by white majoritarian desires to reduce minority student enrollment in public universities. What is surprising, however, is Professor West-Faulcon’s suggestion that state anti–affirmative action laws can themselves be read to
permit precisely the type of race-conscious affirmative action that they
2
might initially be thought to prohibit.
Capitalizing on the self-interested desires of states to avoid federalfunding cutoffs, Professor West-Faulcon constructs an argument that
is both analytically sound and enticingly clever. However, that does
not mean that the argument is free from a potentially fatal flaw. The
problem is that doctrinal arguments alone cannot compel adherence
*
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to policies that are sufficiently unpopular to mobilize effective political opposition. Alternate doctrinal arguments can always be developed that are cogent enough to support the outcomes favored by socially powerful opponents, and the original argument can always be
marginalized to the point where its analytical soundness ceases to appear particularly relevant.
This problem creates a dilemma for those of us who are tempted
to formulate doctrinal arguments as a means of advancing our own
racial-equality agendas. Participation in a syllogistic game that purports to be governed by doctrinal rules but actually uses those rules
simply to mask the dispositive role of political preferences runs the
risk of reinforcing the authenticity of the game itself. But declining
participation in the game precludes the possibility of securing even
those occasional victories that are permitted in order to convey the
impression that the game is legitimate. It is difficult to see how the dilemma can ever be satisfactorily resolved. However, the loss of innocence entailed in recognizing this doctrinal dilemma may, at least,
constitute a step in the right direction.
I. DOCTRINE
In the mid-1990s, political opponents of affirmative action began
using ballot-initiative measures to secure the enactment of state anti–
3
Although supporters typically typically
affirmative action laws.
framed the laws as antidiscrimination measures, and never actually
mentioned the term “affirmative action,” the intended effects included a reduction of minority enrollment in public colleges and universities that had previously been obtained through affirmative action
4
programs. However, the anti–affirmative action laws also included
what Professor West-Faulcon calls “federal-funding exceptions,” which
explicitly stated that the laws did not prohibit actions necessary to
5
maintain eligibility for federal-funding programs. Professor WestFaulcon believes that those federal-funding exceptions preclude a
reading of the anti–affirmative action laws that would violate the prohibition on disparate impact discrimination contained in Title VI of
3

See id. at 1087-90 (discussing California’s Proposition 209, Washington’s Initiative
200, Michigan’s Proposal 2, and Nebraska’s Initiative 424).
4
See id. at 1087 & n.31, 1091 (“State anti-affirmative action laws are the product of
a political and legal campaign to end state-sponsored affirmative action.” (footnote
omitted)).
5
Id. at 1092 & n.49 (citing CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(e); MICH. CONST. art. I,
§ 26(4); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 30(5); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.400(6) (2008)).
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6

the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Her argument is so elegant that it is fun
just to recite it.
Professor West-Faulcon argues that public colleges and universities have responded to state anti–affirmative action laws by eliminating
the affirmative action programs that they used to select students for
7
admission. As a result, minority enrollment in those schools has declined in ways that are statistically significant enough to establish a
prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination prohibited by Title
8
VI. A showing of some “educational necessity” justifying use of the
selection criteria producing a racially disparate impact can rebut a
9
prima facie Title VI violation. However, no such showing justifies the
declines in minority enrollment that have been produced in response
to state antidiscrimination laws. Those declines were produced by
continued heavy reliance on applicant SAT scores, though those
scores do not correlate highly enough with student success in college
10
to warrant the racially disparate impact that they produce. Rather,
the schools’ use of SAT scores is motivated more by a desire to enhance the institutional prestige and financial bond ratings of those
11
schools than to serve as an accurate predictor of student success.
Unlike SAT scores, high-school grades do have a high correlation with
12
college success, and they do not produce the same racially disparate
13
impact that SAT scores do.
Accordingly, reliance on high-school
grades as an admission criterion would constitute a less discriminatory
alternative to the continued use of SAT scores. One cannot say, therefore, that continued use of SAT scores constitutes an educational ne14
cessity within the meaning of Title VI.
Others have argued that the use of selection criteria that produce
a racially disparate impact is inconsistent with statutes such as Title VI
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because those statutes

6

See id. at 1084 (“[U]niversities may invoke the federal-funding exception to defend the readoption of race-conscious admissions policies as legally permissible under
their state’s anti-affirmative action laws.”).
7
Id. at 1086, 1090-93, 1119-20.
8
Id. at 1092-1102.
9
Id. at 1129 n.192 (citing Larry P. ex rel. Lucille P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981 n.6
(9th Cir. 1984)).
10
Id. at 1120-44.
11
Id. at 1105-09.
12
Id. at 1115.
13
Id. at 1127, 1128 & n.189.
14
Id. at 1128.
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15

view disparate impact as a form of prohibited discrimination. Professor West-Faulcon, however, adds a new twist to this argument. She argues that the inclusion of federal-funding exceptions in each of the
new state anti–affirmative action laws controls the way that those state
16
laws must be interpreted and implemented. Because one of the remedies for a disparate impact violation of Title VI is the very loss of
federal funds that the state affirmative action laws explicitly seek to
prevent, the use of race-conscious selection criteria motivated by a desire to avoid federal-funding cutoffs cannot constitute a violation of
those anti–affirmative action laws. Instead, it constitutes the remedial
use of race, rather than the prohibited use of race as a discriminatory
17
preference. Any other reading of state anti–affirmative action laws
18
runs the risk of “normaliz[ing]” lower minority admissions. As a result of Professor West-Faulcon’s doctrinal sleight of hand, state anti–
affirmative action laws end up requiring the very sorts of race-conscious
affirmative action that they might superficially have been thought to
prohibit. This is impressive doctrinal reasoning. But there is a problem.
II. PROBLEM
As cogent as Professor West-Faulcon’s doctrinal argument is, it is
difficult to imagine that the argument could meaningfully change the
attitudes or behavior of affirmative action opponents who currently
believe that state anti–affirmative action laws compel a reduction in
minority student enrollment. The problem is not that Professor WestFaulcon’s doctrinal argument is in any way deficient. The problem is
that doctrine itself is typically unable to overcome strongly motivated
political opposition—especially with respect to the issue of race.
It is possible to evade Professor West-Faulcon’s conclusion that
state anti–affirmative action laws actually permit race-conscious re15

See, e.g., Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three,
117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 506-08, 577-85 (2003) (tracing the development of the Title VII
prohibition on disparate impact discrimination and invoking the expressive content of
the statute to support the constitutionality of the prohibition under the Equal Protection Clause); Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85
CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1494-1501 (1997) (proposing the creation of a new doctrine, “intentional impact theory,” through which “a party could combine evidence of an industry
or profession’s discriminatory intent in adopting or developing certain selection standards with current evidence of disproportionate impact, to create a prima facie case”
under Title VI).
16
West-Faulcon, supra note 1, at 1084.
17
Id. at 1145-58.
18
Id. at 1158.
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medial admissions by challenging some of the doctrinal assumptions
on which her conclusion rests. Professor West-Faulcon’s interpretation of state anti–affirmative action laws depends on her interpretation of Title VI as a federal-funding-based prohibition on the disparate impact that would result from reducing minority student
enrollment in order to comply with state anti–affirmative action laws.
Title VI, however, might not be offended by such disparate impact.
Professor West-Faulcon herself admits that reliance on the SAT scores
that produce this disparate impact might serve as the educationalnecessity justification that would preclude the need for any Title VI
19
disparate impact funding cutoff.
Professor West-Faulcon argues that SAT scores cannot constitute
an educational necessity, because high-school grades are a better predictor of college success than are SAT scores, and the former do not
20
produce the disparate impact generated by the use of the latter. Her
argument, however, assumes that the pursuit of enhanced prestige
and financial bond ratings is not a legitimate interest sufficiently
compelling to qualify as an educational necessity under Title VI. Although Professor West-Faulcon does consider the possibility that prestige and bond ratings might constitute an educational necessity, her
21
rejection of that argument might be too dismissive.
The Supreme Court’s decision upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action plan in Grutter v. Bollinger seems to
recognize that the pursuit of educational prestige is a compelling in22
terest. As Justice Thomas convincingly pointed out, the majority’s
decision to uphold the law school’s affirmative action plan can best be
23
understood as endorsing the pursuit of educational elitism. That is

19

See id. at 1124-26 (conceding that even if “the use of the SAT as an admissions
criterion has a racially discriminatory effect,” Title VI is not violated if “the SAT is necessary to ensure that minority applicants have the requisite college performance ability”).
20
Id. at 1127-28.
21
See id. at 1127 (“[I]t is unclear whether . . . the SAT’s rankings- and prestigeenhancing value . . . would suffice as an educational necessity . . . .”).
22
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327-30 (2003) (holding that the pursuit of
diversity in higher education can constitute a compelling governmental interest under
strict scrutiny applied to racial classifications, and acknowledging deference to educational institutions’ “educational judgment”).
23
See id. at 354-56 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he
Court upholds the use of racial discrimination as a tool to advance the Law School’s
interest in offering a marginally superior education while maintaining an elite institution.”); see also Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 221,
236-37 (2004) (exploring Justice Thomas’s claim that “the [Grutter] Court’s real interest is in protecting elitism”).
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precisely because the law school could have relied on the less discriminatory alternative of pursuing student diversity through the abandonment of LSAT scores if it were willing to incur a potential loss of
24
prestige. In holding that the affirmative action plan survived strict
scrutiny, therefore, the Grutter majority was necessarily holding that
the pursuit of prestige did constitute a compelling state interest.
Professor West-Faulcon goes on to argue that school reliance on
SAT scores to predict college success is unnecessary because the marginal increase in predictive value that SAT scores add to high-school
grades is too small to warrant the disparate impact that the use of SAT
25
scores produces. In reaching that conclusion, however, Professor
West-Faulcon assumes that “[t]he key factual question is whether reliance on the SAT is necessary to ensure that minority applicants have
the requisite college performance ability to attend certain selective
26
public universities in states with anti–affirmative action laws.” But
that need not be the key question. It seems quite legitimate for a
school to rely on admissions criteria designed not simply to identify
qualified students but also to identify the best students in the applicant
pool. If that is the goal, the marginal increase in predictive value provided by SAT scores may, in fact, be sufficient to constitute a Title VI
educational necessity. Indeed, it is not clear why merely being qualified would ever alone be sufficient for admission in a selective student27
ranking environment, where the goal is to admit the best students.
Professor West-Faulcon has rejected Professor Eugene Volokh’s
interpretation of the federal-funding exception contained in state anti–affirmative action laws, but it is not clear what is wrong with Professor Volokh’s interpretation. Based on the statutory language “must be
taken,” Professor Volokh views the federal-funding exception as applying only when race-conscious affirmative action is absolutely necessary

24

See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 367-71 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (discussing alternatives to the use of the LSAT for admissions).
25
West-Faulcon, supra note 1, at 1126.
26
Id.
27
I note—with admiration rather than criticism—that Professor West-Faulcon
seems to shift her emphasis from “best” to “qualified” as necessary to strengthen her
argument. See, e.g., id. at 1154 (arguing that if “the primary interest of a selective public university is to admit the best and brightest high-school students based on their academic merit without regard to race, [SAT] test deficienc[ies] unfairly undermine[]
that goal” because of their “racially discriminatory effect on African American and Latino applicants with the requisite college performance ability to attend the institution” (emphasis added)).
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28

to maintain federal funding. Under this view, if some race-neutral
alternative way of maintaining federal funding is available, then affirmative action is not permitted under state anti–affirmative action laws.
Professor West-Faulcon rejects this argument because she believes it
29
would deprive the exception of any practical effect. Schools could
never be certain that a court would find that all conceivable raceneutral alternatives were literally unavailable, so schools would be unwilling to risk voluntary race-conscious remedial action because that
action might later be held invalid under state anti–affirmative action
30
Professor West-Faulcon, therefore, prefers to borrow the
laws.
strong-basis-in-evidence standard from the Supreme Court’s affirmative action cases—a standard under which schools would be free to
engage in voluntary, race-conscious remedial action if they had a
strong basis in evidence for thinking that the failure to take such ac31
tion would constitute a Title VI disparate impact violation.
Professor West-Faulcon’s argument makes intuitive sense. But
Professor Volokh’s position is arguably more consistent with the idea
of strict scrutiny, which is customarily applied to racial classifications.
Strict scrutiny imposes the heavy burden of proving the existence of a
compelling state interest and a narrowly tailored means for advancing
32
that interest, which is consistent with Professor Volokh’s literalistic
view of state anti–affirmative action laws. It is also worth noting that
even though the Supreme Court has used the strong-basis-in-evidence
standard under strict scrutiny in some of its constitutional affirmative
action race cases, the Court has never found that standard to be satis33
fied. And even the intuitive appeal of Professor West-Faulcon’s argument now seems to have been largely overtaken by a new development. Since her article was published in the spring of 2009, the
28

See Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative: An Interpretive Guide, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1387 (1997) (“If it’s possible to be eligible without the discrimination, then the discrimination is prohibited, because it’s not true that the action ‘must
be taken’ for eligibility.”).
29
West-Faulcon, supra note 1, at 1157-58.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 1148-57 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)).
32
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2752 (2007) (discussing strict scrutiny for racial classifications).
33
The only two cases in which a racial classification has survived strict scrutiny are
the now-discredited Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which upheld a
World War II exclusion order that led to the internment of Japanese Americans, and
the more recent Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), which upheld the University
of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action plan as a narrowly tailored means of advancing a compelling interest in student diversity. Neither case considered the application of the strong-basis-in-evidence standard for remedial affirmative action.
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Supreme Court has decided a new Title VII case that seems to offer
renewed support to the Volokh interpretation.
In Ricci v. DeStefano, decided June 29, 2009, the Supreme Court
invalidated New Haven’s refusal to certify the results of a firefighter
promotion exam that had an adverse, racially disparate impact on mi34
nority firefighters. Even though the city’s actions were motivated by
a desire to avoid a Title VII disparate impact violation, the Court held
that the city’s race-conscious actions constituted a Title VII intentional-discrimination violation that adversely affected the mostly white
35
As Professor
firefighters who outscored minorities on the exam.
West-Faulcon suggested in the context of Title VI, the Ricci Court extended the strong-basis-in-evidence standard that it had previously
used in constitutional affirmative action cases to Title VII disparate
36
impact claims. But the Ricci majority’s application of that standard
was so strained that Justice Ginsburg emphasized in dissent that it was
difficult to see how the Court’s new incarnation of the standard could
ever be satisfied in the absence of an actual adjudication of a disparate
37
impact violation. The Ricci majority was so hostile to the continued
recognition of disparate impact claims that it expressly left open the
question of whether the Title VII disparate impact provision was itself
38
unconstitutional. In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia even suggested that he had already made up his mind that the Title VII dispa39
rate impact provision violated the Constitution. In light of Ricci, it is
difficult to imagine the current Supreme Court accepting Professor
West-Faulcon’s argument that federal funds would have to be cut off if
state anti–affirmative action laws produced a racially disparate impact
in student enrollment. It would be difficult to distinguish a school’s
voluntary effort to avoid a disparate impact on students from New Haven’s voluntary effort to avoid a disparate impact on firefighters. In
fact, it seems more likely that the current anti–affirmative action majority on the Supreme Court would hold unconstitutional any reading
of Title VI that compelled such a result, in the same way that it has

34

See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664-65 (2009).
Id. at 2664.
36
See id. at 2664-65, 2675-77 (“[W]e adopt the strong-basis-in-evidence standard as
a matter of statutory construction to resolve any conflict between the disparatetreatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title VII.”).
37
Id. at 2700-02 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
38
Id. at 2676 (majority opinion).
39
Id. at 2681-83 (Scalia, J., concurring).
35
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threatened to hold the disparate impact provision of Title VII uncons40
titutional.
Finally, the “four-fifths rule” that Professor West-Faulcon favors for
41
establishing a prima facie case of Title VI disparate impact seems to
be in tension with the Grutter Court’s aversion to quotas, mathematical
42
ratios, and racial balancing. Moreover, the Ricci Court gave short
shrift to the EEOC interpretive guideline that would have insulated
New Haven’s efforts to prevent disparate impact from Title VII liabili43
It is true that the Grutter Court deferred to the “educational
ty.
judgment” of educational institutions in determining the degree to
44
which racial affirmative action was educationally desirable. But it is
precisely that judgment that the voters chose to override when they
passed their state anti–affirmative action ballot initiatives.
III. DILEMMA
Personally, I find Professor West-Faulcon’s argument more persuasive than my suggested evasions of her argument. But that is because
I already agree with her conclusion. I believe that state anti–
affirmative action laws actually constitute a recent incarnation of the
longstanding commitment to the sacrifice of racial-minority interests
for the benefit of the white majority in the United States. From slavery and the genocide of indigenous Indians to Japanese-American internment and the current resegregation of public schools, United
States society has always found ways to discriminate against racial mi45
norities when it wished to do so. For me, the colorblind race neutrality that state anti–affirmative action laws purport to restore is simply a technique for freezing an unequal baseline in the distribution of
40

In recent decades, the Court has expressed unmistakable hostility to racial affirmative action. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 205-09,
226, 235-37 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to a federal-funding program containing
an affirmative action preference for minority contractors). The preference was ultimately abandoned on remand. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103,
106 (2001).
41
West-Faulcon, supra note 1, at 1120-23, 1128-30.
42
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330, 334 (2003) (“To be narrowly tailored,
a race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota system . . . .”); cf. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-76 (2003) (invalidating the University of Michigan’s undergraduate affirmative action plan, which mechanically awarded points to minority applicants).
43
See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2699-2700 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing the EEOC
interpretive guidelines and the majority’s lack of deference to those guidelines).
44
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-33.
45
See Girardeau A. Spann, Disintegration, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 565, 591-92,
597-607 (2008).
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societal resources that was produced by a long history of discrimina46
Further, the distinction between merit and the reversetion.
discrimination racial preferences that anti–affirmative action laws
purport to end is simply a smokescreen designed to make continued
47
I know that
white majoritarian discrimination appear legitimate.
Professor West-Faulcon is aware of these structural arguments, be48
cause she cites them in her article. But she chose not to emphasize
them, presumably because her Title VI doctrinal argument would
have more credibility if it could not be dismissed as yet another systemic “societal discrimination” claim whose validity the Supreme
49
Court refuses to recognize. And therein lies the problem.
Doctrine does not matter much when outcomes are predetermined by political or ideological beliefs. If the Supreme Court were
to construe the meaning of the federal-funding exception to state anti–affirmative action laws—or were to rule on the constitutionality of
those laws themselves—the outcome would be determined more by
the Court’s personnel and the prevailing political climate than by any
controlling doctrinal imperative. Everyone knows this to be true. And
yet we continue to formulate carefully crafted doctrinal arguments, as

46

See Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47 DUKE L.J. 187, 190-92, 241-70 (1997).
See Roithmayr, supra note 15, at 1469-81 (“Far from being the opposite of ‘bias,’
the concept of merit is necessarily inscribed with subjective, status-based social bias,
which merit sought to exclude in the first place.”).
48
See e.g., West-Faulcon, supra note 1, at 1082 n.15 (citing Roithmayr, supra note
15, at 1473-81); id. at 1087 n.31 (citing Spann, supra note 46, at 189).
49
This prohibition on the use of legal remedies to redress general societal discrimination as opposed to identifiable acts of particularized discrimination was articulated by Justice Lewis Powell in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 307-10 (1978), and reasserted by Justice Powell in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 274-78 (1986) (plurality opinion). Led by Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor, this view has now been adopted by a majority of the Court. See Grutter, 539
U.S. at 323-25 (stating that Bakke “rejected an interest in remedying societal discrimination”); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909-10 (1996) (requiring “identified discrimination” to justify a government’s use of racial distinctions under the Equal Protection
Clause (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547, 610-14 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court has long recognized the government’s interest in remedying identified discrimination); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496-98 (1989) (plurality opinion) (same); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 647-53 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (rejecting “societal discrimination” as a justification for affirmative action
under Title VII); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[A] governmental agency’s interest in remedying ‘societal’ discrimination, that is, discrimination
not traceable to its own actions, cannot be deemed sufficiently compelling to pass constitutional muster under strict scrutiny.”).
47
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if syllogistic analysis were likely to determine outcomes rather than
merely the opinions issued to rationalize those outcomes.
Those of us who wish to use law as a means of promoting racial
justice therefore confront a serious dilemma. If we continue to make
doctrinal arguments, knowing that those arguments are unlikely to
determine outcomes, we simply reinforce the legitimacy of a social system that uses law and adjudication as one of its tools for the continued oppression of racial minorities. But if we stop participating in the
process of doctrinal adjudication, we risk losing those sporadic concessions that even an oppressive social system must occasionally make
to those whom it oppresses in an effort to prevent bottled-up frustrations from ripening into serious threats of destabilizing change.
CONCLUSION
It might be that when racial minorities seek to advance their interests from a position of political weakness, all that they can realistically hope for are the intermittent concessions that the white majority
permits to trickle down. If that is true, racial minorities ought at least
to understand that this is what is going on. Doctrinal arguments can
then be viewed as an available form of political action, rather than as
proof that the white majority can trick racial minorities into falling for
the legitimacy of a system that gets minorities to participate willingly
in their own oppression. But continued minority participation in doctrinal analysis without this level of self-awareness may prove to be as
pathetic as it has been effective.
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